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CHILDREN, THE DEATH PENALTY AND THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF STANFORD v.

KENTUCKY
I.

INTRODUCTION

Constitutional challenges to the death penalty most often have their
foundations in the "cruel and unusual" punishment language contained
in the eighth amendment.' Despite strong arguments against the constitutionality of the death penalty, 2 the United States Supreme Court, in
the 1976 case of Gregg v. Georgia,3 held constitutional capital punishment
for the crime of murder under both the eighth 4 and fourteenth 5 amendments. 6 "According to Gregg, a penalty must both abide by contempo1. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The eighth amendment provides: "Excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." Id.
2. See, e.g.,
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). The
Court stated its holding in a brief per curiam opinion which failed to set out the
majority's reasoning. Id. Justice Brennan, in concurrence, concluded that capital punishment was unconstitutional because it was unusually severe, arbitrarily
inflicted, substantially rejected by contemporary society and failed to more effectively serve any penal purpose. Id. at 286 (Brennan,J., concurring). Justice Marshall, also concurring, concluded that capital punishment was unconstitutional
because it was "excessive and unnecessary" in light of possible penological
goals. Id. at 358 (Marshall, J., concurring). He also stated that if it was not
excessive, "it nonetheless violates the Eighth Amendment because it is morally
unacceptable to the people of the United States at this time in their history." Id.
at 360 (Marshall, J., concurring). His test of the death penalty's unacceptability
was measured by the opinion of "people who were fully informed as to the purposes of the penalty and its liabilities [who] would find the penalty shocking,
unjust, and unacceptable." Id. at 361 (Marshall, J., concurring).
3. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
4. For the text of the eighth amendment, see supra note 1.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, sec. 1. Section one of the fourteenth amendment provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.

Id.
6. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 168-69. The Court stated:
The Court on a number of occasions has both assumed and asserted the constitutionality of capital punishment. In several cases that
assumption provided a necessary foundation for the decision, as the
Court was asked to decide whether a particular method of carrying out
a capital sentence would be allowed to stand under the Eighth Amendment. But until Furman v. Georgia, the Court never confronted squarely
the fundamental claim that the punishment of death always, regardless

(641)
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rary society's perceptions of standards of decency and accord with the
7
'dignity of man' to pass eighth amendment analysis."
Constitutional challenges to the death penalty have an added dimension when the offender is a juvenile.8 Until recently, the Supreme
Court avoided addressing the constitutionality of capital punishment applied to offenders under the age of eighteen. 9 In 1988, however, the
Court addressed capital punishment for fifteen-year-old offenders and
stated that such punishment violates the eighth amendment. 10 Neverof the enormity of the offense or the procedure followed in imposing
the sentence, is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Constitution. Although this issue was presented and addressed in Furman,
it was not resolved by the Court. Four Justices would have held that
capital punishment is not unconstitutional per se; two Justices would
have reached the opposite conclusion; and three Justices, while agreeing that the statutes then before the Court were invalid as applied, left
open the question whether such punishment may even be imposed. We
now hold that the punishment of death does not invariably violate the
Constitution.
Id.
7. Gersten, The Constitutionality of Executing Juvenile Offenders: Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 24 CRIM. L. BULL. 91, 105 (1988); see Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173. The
Court stated: "[A]n assessment of contemporary values concerning the infliction of a challenged sanction is relevant to the application of the Eighth Amendment ....
A penalty also must accord with 'the dignity of man', which is the
basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment." Id.
8. See V. STREIB, DEATH PENALTY FORJUVENILEs 34-37 (1987). According to
some, the death penalty for juveniles does not make a measurable contribution
to the goals of retribution and deterrence. Id. at 34-35. "Society does not feel
the same satisfying, cleansing reaction when a child is executed" because of the
child's lack of complete responsibility. Id. at 35. Therefore the principle reason
in favor of retribution is not met. Id. The goal of deterrence, too, is not met by
juvenile executions because "young persons are inexperienced and unable to
avoid detrimental choices in general." Id. at 36.
9. Note,Juvenile Death Penalty: Counsel's Role in the Development of a Mitigation
Defense, 53 BROOKLYN L. REV. 767, 768 (1987). Recent case law suggests an initial reluctance on the part of the Supreme Court to squarely address the issue of
capital punishment for juveniles, and then, once addressed, a reluctance to extend the holding to all offenders under the age of 18. Id. at 795-805. For example, consider the circumstances surrounding the case of Roach v. South Carolina.
James Terry Roach was 17 years old when he sexually molested Carlotta Hartness and then murdered her and her boyfriend, Thomas Taylor. Id. at 795-96.
Roach filed a petition of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court on the
issue of age, which was denied. Id. at 795 n.197 (citing Roach v. South Carolina,
444 U.S. 1026 (1980)). The United States Supreme Court denied Roach's petition for certiorari two more times. Id. (citing Roach v. Martin, 474 U.S. 865
(1985); Roach v. South Carolina, 455 U.S. 927 (1982)); see Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104 (1982) (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 606 (1978)). The
issue of the constitutionality of capital punishment for juveniles was not fully
developed because defense counsel did not present sufficient evidence of mitigating factors. Id. at 799-805; see Trimble v. State, 300 Md. 387, 478 A.2d 1143
(1984) (17-year-old who commits rape and murder not shielded from capital
punishment by eighth amendment), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1230 (1985).
10. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). In Thompson, the Court
addressed the issue of the death penalty for minors. Id. at 818-19. The Court,
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theless, the Court left unanswered whether capital punishment imposed
on sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders would pass constitutional
scrutiny.
In 1989, in the consolidated cases of Stanford v. Kentucky " and Wilkins v. Missouri,' 2 the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of

capital punishment for sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders.' 3 In
this much anticipated decision, a plurality of the Court rejected a strict
application of the two-prong test set forth in Gregg. 14 Although the plurality, in reviewing the respective sentences under the first prong of the
cruel and unusual punishment test, stated that capital punishment for a
sixteen-year-old offender was consistent with "the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society," it declined to
15
apply an excessiveness analysis under the second prong.
6
This Note will discuss the cruel and unusual punishment clause' of
the eighth amendment and will trace the Supreme Court's scrutiny of
the states' use of capital punishment in light of the two-prong test of
Gregg' 7 and its applicability to juvenile offenders.' 8 It will also discuss
the Stanford decision and its inquiry into the contours of the cruel and
unusual punishment clause.' 9 Additionally, this Note proposes that jury
sentences and international norms are relevant factors when addressing
issues of eighth amendment interpretation and should have been considered in Stanford when the Court inquired into the "evolving standards
'20
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."
however, responded only to the constitutionality of applying the death penalty
to offenders less than 16 years of age and refused to prohibit executions for all
persons under the age of 18. Id. at 838. For a further discussion of Thompson,
see infra notes 88-100 and accompanying text.
11. 109 S.Ct. 2969 (1989). The petitioner, Kevin Stanford, was approximately 17 years and four months old at the time he committed murder. Id. at
2972.
12. Id. at 2969. The petitioner, Heath Wilkins, was approximately 16 years
and six months of age at the time he committed murder. Id. at 2973.
13. Id. at 2972.
14. Id. at 2980. For a discussion of the plurality's methodology, see infra
notes 117-43.
15. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2980 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958)). For a discussion of the Court's application of the Gregg test, see infra
notes 130-43 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the cruel and unusual punishment clause, see infra
notes 21-34 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of Supreme Court death penalty cases, see infra notes
33-72 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's review of juvenile capital punishment cases, see infra notes 80-100 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of Stanford's interpretation of cruel and unusual punishment, see infra notes 112-21 and accompanying text.
20. It is submitted that jury determinations and international norms are relevant in ascertaining civilized standards, as the dissent in Stanford indicated.
Stanford, 109 S.Ct. at 2984-86 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a discussion ofjury
determinations, see infra notes 162-85 and accompanying text. For a discussion
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BACKGROUND

Cruel and Unusual Punishment

The eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause has
its origins in the English Bill of Rights, 2 1 and the principle it represents
traces back to the Magna Carta.2 2 Although the English "cruel and unusual punishment" clause focused on punishments disproportionate to
the offenses involved, it "appears to have been also directed against
punishments unauthorized by statute and beyond jurisdiction of the sentencing Court." 2 3s Conversely, the framers of the American version
were primarily concerned "with proscribing 'tortures' and other 'barbarous' methods of punishment." 24 Through evolving constitutional analysis, the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause
today essentially prohibits "all punishments which by their excessive
length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offenses
25
charged."
In reviewing a punishment under the cruel and unusual punishment
clause, the Supreme Court employs a "heavy" presumption that the enacting legislature acted constitutionally. 2 6 The Court does not require
the state legislature to select the least severe penalty possible, so long as
the penalty chosen rationally relates to the legitimate ends of punishment: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation. 27 Consequently, it is contingent on the challenger to rebut this presumption in
28
order to avoid the prescribed punishment.
Three possible avenues are available for a challenger to rebut this
heavy presumption in favor of the state. First, he can attempt to make
the difficult showing that the punishment in issue was unconstitutional
at the time of the eighth amendment's adoption.2 9 Second, he may
of international norms and their effect on the United States, see infra notes 186244 and accompanying text.
21. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 243 (1972) (Douglas,J., concurring).
"The English Bill of Rights, enacted December 16, 1689, stated that excessive
bail ought not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." Id. (Douglas, J., concurring).
22. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
23. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169-70 (citing Granucci, "Nor Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Inflicted": The OriginalMeaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 852-53
(1969)).
24. Id. at 170 (citing Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted":
The OriginalMeaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 842 (1969)).
25. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982) (quoting Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 371 (1910) (quoting O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 33940 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting))).
26. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 175.
27. Id.
28. Id. The Gregg Court stated that the burden of proof rests upon the
party who attacks the judgment of the democratically-elected legislatures. Id.
29. The Court may consider what was cruel and unusual in 1789 as one
indicator of cruel and unusual punishment today. See generally Furman v. Geor-
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show that the punishment has become cruel and unusual in the views of
conventional society, and therefore, unconstitutional.3 0 Finally, he may
attempt to show that the punishment is "excessive" and consequently
not in "accord with the dignity of man."''s The following section will
discuss the Court's eighth amendment scrutiny of states' use of capital
punishment in light of this heavy presumption against challengers to the
32
death penalty.
B.

Eighth Amendment Scrutiny of the Death Penalty

The Court, in the seminal case of Gregg v. Georgia,33 set forth a twoprong test for determining the continued validity of a state imposed
34
If
punishment that passed muster under the initial historical analysis.
the punishment fails under either prong, the petitioner overcomes the
35
presumption of constitutionality and the punishment is struck down.
The first prong of the test questions whether society has come to view
the punishment under consideration as cruel and unusual.3 6 Thus the
issue may be framed as whether society, if it were enacting the eighth
amendment today, would ban the particular punishment. The second
prong of the Gregg test analyzes the excessiveness of the punishment in
order to ensure that it comports with the basic concept of human dignity.3 7 The basic distinction between the two prongs is that the first
gia, 408 U.S. 238, 244 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring). The debates of the First
Congress shed little light on the framers' true intent, although there is evidence
to believe that the framers would have condoned whipping as well as the cutting
off of ears. Id. (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 754 (1789)). See generally Sandalow,
Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MIcH. L. REV. 1033, 1033 (1981).
30. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 171 (citing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,
373 (1910)). The Gregg Court held that the eighth amendment is to be interpreted in a "flexible and dynamic manner" in accordance with changing and

evolving notions of societal values, Id. For a further discussion of contemporary
society's perceptions of standards of decency, see infra notes 38-44.

31. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183-84. In order to be proportional to the crime, and
not excessive, a punishment must meet penological goals such as retribution and
deterrence. Id. For a further discussion of the "excessiveness" analysis, see infra notes 59-70 and accompanying text.
32. Because authorization of the death penalty falls within acceptable state
authority, this heavy presumption against the challenger is employed by the

Supreme Court when it reviews the constitutionality of state-imposed death
sentences.
33. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).

34. For a discussion of this two-pronged test, see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
35. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173-75.

36. For a discussion of this prong, see supra note 30 and accompanying text.
37. For a discussion of this prong, see supra note 31 and accompanying text;
see also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173. In its evaluation of capital punishment the Gregg
Court stated: "[W]hen a life has been taken deliberately by the offender, we

cannot say that the punishment is invariably disproportionate to the crime. It is
an extreme sanction suitable to the most extreme of crimes." Id. at 187. For a
further discussion of this prong, see infra notes 52-61.
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prong determines whether the punishment is per se unconstitutional,
while the second prong determines the constitutionality of its imposition
in the particular situation.
1. Evolving Standards of Decency
The Court looks to contemporary societal norms to determine
38
whether public opinion has sanctioned certain forms of punishment.
The Court specifically analyzed punishment in light of contemporary societal norms in Trop v. Dulles 3 9 where the phrase "evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" was first set
forth. 40 In Trop, the Court held that stripping a person of citizenship for
deserting the military was inconsistent with societal norms. 4 1 The Court
stated that "[w]hile the state has the power to punish, the [eighth]
amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards." '4 2 The Court took into consideration standards within the national and international political community to
determine whether denationalization was barred by the eighth amendment. 43 Trop thus established the principle of interpreting the eighth
amendment in accordance with standards shared by "civilized
4
nations." 4
In the context of capital punishment, the Supreme Court in Gregg v.
Georgia45 incorporated the Trop "evolving standards of decency" requirement into the first prong of its two part test. 4 6 Gregg involved a
challenge to Georgia's death penalty statute by a defendant convicted of
murder. 4 7 Contending that contemporary society rejected application
of the death penalty under all circumstances, the petitioner argued that
the imposition of the death penalty in his case violated both the eighth
and fourteenth amendments. 48 The Court agreed with the petitioner
that an eighth amendment analysis required an inquiry into the values
38. For a discussion of this view, see supra note 30.
39. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
40. Id. at 101.
41. Id. at 102. The Court stated: "The civilized nations of the world are in
virtual unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for
crime." Id.
42. Id. at 100.
43. Id. at 101-02.
44. Id.
45. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
46. Id. at 173 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1957)).
47. Id. at 158-62. The petitioner Troy Gregg and his accomplice were
charged with armed robbery and murder. Id. at 158. The jury, at trial level,
returned a sentence of death. Id. at 161. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the imposition of the death sentence for murder and "concluded that,
considering the nature of the crime and the defendant, the sentences of death
had not resulted from prejudice or any other arbitrary factor and were not excessive or disproportionate to the penalty applied in similar cases." Id.
48. Id. at 162.
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held by modern society. 4 9 The Court found as a factual matter, however, that society had not, as yet, rejected the death penalty as an appropriate punishment for murder. 50 Consequently, the Court held that the
punishment of death for the crime of murder did not, under all circum5
stances, violate the eighth and fourteenth amendments. '
To ascertain "evolving standards of decency," the Gregg Court primarily looked to legislative enactments and jury sentences to determine
whether or not modern day society endorses the death penalty as a punishment for murder. 5 2 Through evaluation of capital punishment statutes, the Gregg Court determined that capital punishment had not been
rejected by state legislatures as an appropriate punishment for murder. 53 Furthermore, in reviewing actions of juries in sentencing, the
Court concluded that they were compatible with legislative judgments
because they reflected the "continued utility and necessity of capital
punishment in appropriate cases." '54 Thus, Gregg established utilization
of legislative enactments and jury sentencing trends as indicators of contemporary society's values.
The Court in Coker v. Georgia 55 adhered to this precedent when it
held that the eighth amendment forbade a death sentence for the crime
of rape. 56 Under the first prong of the Gregg test, the Coker Court, by
reviewing state statutes and jury sentences, determined that "most
'57
American jurisdictions do not presently make rape a capital offense."
49. Id. at 171.
50. For a discussion of the appropriateness of the death penalty as a punishment for murder, see infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
51. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187. The Court stated: "We hold that the death penalty is not a form of punishment that may never be imposed, regardless of the
circumstances of the offense, regardless of the character of the offender, and
regardless of the procedure followed in reaching the decision to impose it." Id.
52. Id. at 181-82. The Court emphasized the importance ofjury actions to
ascertain contemporary societal norms. Id. The Gregg Court also stated: "The
deference we owe to the decisions of the state legislatures under our federal
system is enhanced where the specification of punishments is concerned, for
'these are peculiarly questions of legislative policy.' " Id. at 176 (quoting Gore v.
United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958)). For a broader discussion of the relevance of jury sentencing trends, see infra notes 162-85 and accompanying text.
53. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179-81. The Court stated: "The most marked indication of society's endorsement of the death penalty for murder is the legislative
response to Furman. The legislatures of at least 35 states have enacted new statutes that provide for the death penalty for at least some crimes that result in the
death of another person." Id. at 179-80 (footnote omitted).
54. Id. at 182. The Court noted that "the reluctance ofjuries in many cases
to impose the death sentence may reflect the humane feeling that this most irrevocable of sanctions should be reserved for a small number of extreme cases."
Id.
55. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
56. Id. at 592.
57. Id. at 613 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Coker Court stated:
The upshot is that Georgia is the sole jurisdiction in the United States
at the present time that authorizes a sentence of death when the rape
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Moreover, the Coker Court added another element to its objective determination of societal norms. Echoing Trop's standards of decency
"shared by civilized nations," the Coker Court acknowledged international opinion concerning the acceptability of the death penalty as a
punishment for rape. 5R As a result, the Court recognized three factors-legislative enactments, jury sentencing trends and international
standards-as relevant in assessing contemporary values under the
eighth amendment.
2.

Punishment Must "Accord with the Dignity of Man"

In Gregg, the Court looked to legislative enactments and jury
sentences to determine whether contemporary society endorsed capital
punishment for the crime of murder. The Court stated, however, that
although legislative measures were important means of ascertaining
contemporary values, 59 they "alone cannot be determinative of eighth
amendment standards since that amendment functioned to safeguard individuals from the abuse of legislative powers." '60 Thus, the Court refused to rely solely on objective indicia. 6 1 Instead, the Court
incorporated a second, more subjective test requiring that the punishment "accord with the dignity of man."'6 2 As the Court stated, this
means at least "that the punishment not be 'excessive.' "63 Under this
prong, a punishment is excessive, and thus unconstitutional, if it invictim is an adult woman, and only two other jurisdictions provide capital punishment when the victim is a child ....
The current judgment with respect to the death penalty for rape is
not wholly unanimous among state legislatures, but it obviously weighs
very heavily on the side of rejecting capital punishment as a suitable
penalty for raping an adult woman.
Id. at 595-96.
With respect to sentencing, the Court noted: "Georgia juries have.., sentenced rapists to death six times since 1973. This obviously is not a negligible
number .... Nevertheless, it is true that in the vast majority of cases, at least 9

out of 10, juries have not imposed the death sentence." Id. at 597.
58. Id. at 596 n.10. The Court stated "that out of 60 major nations in the
world surveyed in 1965, only 3 retained the death penalty for rape where death
did not ensue." Id. (citing UNITED NATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 40, 86 (1968)).
59. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 174 n.19. The Gregg Court discussed the weight and
power of political majorities when state legislatures enact state statutes. Id. at
175-76. The Court further stated that "[t]his does not mean that judges have no
role to play, for the eighth amendment is a restraint upon the exercise of legislative power." Id. at 174.
60. Id. The Court stated: "It seems conceded by all that the Amendment
imposes some obligations on the judiciary to judge the constitutionality of punishment and that there are punishments that the Amendment would bar whether
legislatively applied or not." Id. (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 31314 (1972) (White, J., concurring)).
61. Id. at 182.

62. Id.
63. Id. at 173 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)).
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volves "the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" and is "grossly
out of proportion to the severity of the crime." 64
In order to determine the proportionality of the punishment to the
crime, the Gregg Court looked to see if the punishment served the goals
of retribution and deterrence. 65 In deciding whether goals of retribution were met, the Court stated that "the decision that capital punishment may be the appropriate sanction in extreme cases is an expression
of the community's belief that certain crimes are themselves so grievous
an affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be the penalty of death."' 66 In determining whether the goal of deterrence was
met, the Court stated that "[s]tatistical attempts to evaluate the worth of
the death penalty as a deterrent to crimes by potential offenders" were
presently inconclusive. 6 7 The Court concluded that "in the absence of
more convincing evidence.., the infliction of death as a punishment for
murder is not without justification and thus is not unconstitutionally severe." 6 8 The Court utilized this proportionality analysis the following
year in Coker, 69 where the Court opined that death is an excessive punishment for rape because the crime does not, in and of itself, cause the
70
death of the victim.
The Gregg decision thus established a methodology for analyzing
the constitutionality of applying the death penalty to capital crimes. The
Court did not apply the Gregg test in the context ofjuvenile capital punishment until 1988 when the Court, in Thompson v. Oklahoma,71 finally
addressed the constitutionality of the death penalty for fifteen-year-old
72
offenders.
64. Id. The Gregg Court opined:
When a form of punishment in the abstract (in this case, whether capital punishment may ever be imposed as a sanction for murder) rather
than in the particular (the propriety of death as a penalty to be applied
to a specific defendant for a specific crime) is under consideration, the
inquiry into "excessiveness" has two aspects. First, the punishment
must not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Second, the punishment must not be grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.
Id. (citations omitted).
65. Id. at 183.
66. Id. at 184.
67. Id. at 184-85.
68. Id. at 187.
69. 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
70. Id. at 597-98. The Coker Court also stated: "These recent events evidencing the attitude of state legislatures and sentencing juries do not wholly
determine this controversy, for the Constitution contemplates that in the end
our own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of
the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 597.
71. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
72. For a discussion of Thompson, see infra notes 88-100 and accompanying
text.
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The Death Penalty for Juveniles

The Death Penaltyfor Juveniles at Common Law
William Blackstone, in his famous Commentaries on English Common

Law, wrote that an offender's "defect of understanding" barred maximum punishment. 73 Blackstone included infancy as one of several
classes which fell under this blanket term.7 4 Blackstone divided infancy
into three stages: infantia, the period from birth until seven years of age;
puertia, which included ages seven to fourteen; and pubertas, which was
the period from fourteen to twenty-five. 7 5 During the last stage, minors
76
were held culpable for their crimes and could face capital punishment.
In many cases, however, children between the ages of seven and fourteen were put to death because the "capacity of doing ill, or contracting
guilt, [was] not so much measured by years and days as by the strength
of the delinquent's understanding and judgment."'7 7 Essentially, an individual's peculiar capacity was the determinative factor. Yet, despite
the willingness of the common law to impose capital punishment on offenders under the age of fourteen, the execution of children was never
78
common in England.
The tradition of sparing minors under the English common law apparently carried over into the colonies. "Of the 14,029 known legal executions in American history, [over the span of the last three hundred
years] 287 [or two percent] of them have been for crimes committed by
79
persons under the age of eighteen."
73. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *21.
74. Id. Blackstone wrote:
[T]here are three circumstances where the will does not join with the
act: 1. Where there is a defect of understanding ....
2. Where
there is understanding and will sufficient residing in the party, but not
called forth or exerted at the time of the action done ....
3. Where
the action is constrained by some outward force and violence.
Id. (footnote omitted). Infancy fell under the first circumstance where there was
a defect of understanding. Id.
75. Id. at *22 Blackstone noted: "Infants under the age of discretion
ought not to be punished by any criminal prosecution whatever. What the age
of discretion is, in various nations, is a matter of some variety." Id. Under the
civil law, minors were considered to be those under the age of 25. Id.
76. Id. at *23.
77. Id. Blackstone wrote: "Also, under fourteen, though an infant shall be
prima facie adjudged to be doli incapax [incapable of guile], yet if it appear[s] to
the court and jury that he was doli capax [capable of guile], and could discern
between good and evil, he may be convicted and suffer death." Id. (footnotes
omitted).
78. V. STREIB, supra note 8, at 24.
79. Streib, Death Penaltyfor Children: The American Experience with CapitalPunishmentfor Crimes Committed While Under Age Eighteen, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 613, 618-19
(1983) (footnote omitted); see also V. STREIB, supra note 8, at 3-7.
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Supreme Court Cases

In the 1978 case of Lockett v. Ohio, 80 the Supreme Court first recognized the issue of minors and the death penalty. 8 ' In Lockett, the Court
stated that the "eighth and fourteenth amendments require that the sentencer . . . consider[], as a mitigatingfactor, any aspect of a defendant's

character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense," '8 2 including age. 83 Four years after Lockett, in Eddings v. Oklahoma,84 the
Supreme Court directly faced the issue of the death penalty for minors. 85 Because "the trial court 'refused' to consider relevant mitigating
evidence in violation of Lockett v. Ohio," however, the Court's holding
skirted the age issue. 86 Nevertheless, the majority intimated that there
appeared to be no consitutional bar to the imposition of the death pen87
alty on sixteen-year-old offenders.
In 1988 the Supreme Court, in Thompson v. Oklahoma,8 8 finally addressed the issue of the death penalty for juveniles. 89 The Court, in a
plurality decision, 90 held that the execution of a person who was less
than sixteen years of age at the time of the offense violated civilized stan80. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
81. Id. at 589.
82. Id. at 604 (emphasis in original). "[S]entencing procedures should not
create 'a substantial risk that the death penalty [will] be inflicted in an arbitrary
and capricious manner.'" Id. at 601 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
188 (1976)).

83. Id. at 608. The Court considered Lockett's contention that "her death
sentence [was] invalid because the statute under which it was imposed did not
permit the sentencing judge to consider, as mitigating factors, her character,
prior record, age, lack of specific intent to cause death, and her relatively minor
part in the crime." Id. at 597.
84. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
85. Id. at 120 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). ChiefJustice Burger stated:
It is important at the outset to remember-as the Court does notthe narrow question on which we granted certiorari. We took care to
limit our consideration to whether the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the imposition of a death sentence on an offender because he was 16 years old in 1977 at the time he committed the offense;
review of all other questions raised in the petition for certiorari was
denied.
Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 116-17 (state court refused to consider as mitigating circumstance
petitioner's unhappy upbringing and emotional disturbance).
87. Id. at 116. The majority did not suggest that there was an "absence of
legal responsibility where the crime [wa]s committed by a minor." Id. The
Court stated: "We are concerned here only with the manner of the imposition
of the ultimate penalty: the death sentence imposed for the crime of murder
upon an emotionally disturbed youth with a disturbed child's immaturity." Id.
88. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
89. Id. at 821.
90. Id. at 818. Justice Stevens announced the judgment of the Court, and
delivered an opinion in which Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall and Justice
Blackmun joined. Id.Justice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 848.
Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justice White and Chief Jus-
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dards of decency and was thus unconstitutional. 9 1 In reaching this con92
clusion, the plurality applied the two-prong test established in Gregg.
Under the first prong, the Thompson Court reviewed relevant legislative
enactments and jury determinations. 9 3 The Court found that all state
death penalty statutes establishing a minimum age required that the defendant "have attained at least the age of sixteen at the time of the capital offense."'94 Looking at jury sentencing trends, the Court concluded
that in the past four decades, since 1948, when the last execution of a
juvenile offender took place, juries had refused to impose the death penalty. 95 Under the Gregg second prong, the Thompson Court ultimately
decided whether the death penalty was directly related to the personal
culpability of the fifteen year old defendant. 9 6 The Court stated that
"[g]iven the lesser culpability of the juvenile offender, the teenager's
capacity for growth, and society's fiduciary obligations to its children"
retribution as a societal objective could not be met by the imposition of
the death penalty. 9 7 Furthermore, the Court found that the deterrence

rationale was unacceptable in this context because teenage offenders are
rarely deterred by the possibility of execution. 9 8
The Thompson plurality, in its assessment of objective indicia under
tice Rehnquist. Id. at 859. Justice Kennedy took no part in the decision. Id. at
838.
91. Id. at 830. In concurring, Justice O'Connor stated: "Oklahoma has enacted a statute that authorizes capital punishment for murder, without setting
any minimum age at which the commission of murder may lead to the imposition of that penalty. The State has also . . .provided that 15-year-old murder

defendants may be treated as adults." Id. at 857. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 822-23.
93. Id. at 822 n.5.
94. Id. at 829. The Thompson Court confined its conclusion to the 18 state
death penalty statutes that have expressly established a minimum age. Id.
95. Id. at 832 ("The road we have travelled during the past four decadesin which thousands ofjuries have tried murder cases-leads to the unambiguous
conclusion that the imposition of the death penalty on a 15-year-old offender is
now generally abhorrent to the conscience of the community.").
96. Id. at 833-38.
97. Id. at 834.
98. Id. at 837. The Court stated:
The Department of Justice statistics indicate that about 98 percent of
the arrests for willful homicide involved persons who were over 16 at
the time of the offense. Thus, excluding younger persons from the
class that is eligible for the death penalty will not diminish the deterrent
value of capital punishment for the vast majority of potential offenders.
And even with respect to those under 16 years of age, it is obvious that
the potential deterrent value of the death sentence is insignificant for
two reasons. The likelihood that the teenage offender has made the
kind of cost-benefit analysis that attaches any weight to the possibility
of execution is so remote as to be virtually non-existent. And, even if
one posits such a cold-blooded calculation by a 15-year-old, it is fanciful to believe that he would be deterred by the knowledge that a small
number of persons his age have been executed during the 20th century.
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the first prong of Gregg, also gave consideration to international standards which addressed juvenile executions. 9 9 The Court stated that its
holding was "consistent with the views that have been expressed by
respected professional organizations, by other nations that share our
Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading members of the Western
00
European Community."'
Although resolving the death penalty issue with regard to juveniles
under the age of sixteen, the Thompson Court left open whether state
statutes prescribing the death penalty for sixteen- and seventeen-yearold offenders would pass constitutional scrutiny. The Court moved
quickly to resolve this issue by granting certiorari in the cases of Stanford
v. Kentucky and Wilkins v. Missouri nine months after the Thompson
decision.
III.

DISCUSSION

In 1989, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of capital punishment for sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders when it decided the
fate of Kevin Stanford and Heath Wilkins.' 0 ' Seventeen-year-old Kevin
Stanford first raped, then sodomized, and finally shot Baeirbel Poore after robbing a gas station.' 0 2 Stanford was certified for trial as an adult
and convicted of murder, first degree sodomy, first degree robbery and
receiving stolen property.' 0 3 He was sentenced to death and forty-five
years in prison for his crimes.' 0 4 The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed
5
his death sentence.1
99. Id. at 830-31. The Court specifically looked to countries that share the
American heritage and to the Western European Community:
Although the death penalty has not been entirely abolished in the
United Kingdom or New Zealand (it has been abolished in Australia,
except in the State of New South Wales, where it is available for treason
and piracy), in neither of those countries may a juvenile be executed.
The death penalty has been abolished in West Germany, France, Portugal, The Netherlands, and all of the Scandinavian countries, and is
available only for exceptional crimes such as treason in Canada, Italy,
Spain, and Switzerland. Juvenile executions are also prohibited in the
Soviet Union.
Id.
100. Id. at 830.
101. Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S.Ct. 2969 (1989).
102. Id. at 2972-73.
103. Id. at 2973. Stanford was certified under a Kentucky statute which
provided that juvenile court jurisdiction can be waived and an offender tried as
an adult if he was either charged with a class A felony or capital crime, or was
over 16 years of age and charged with a felony. Id. (citing Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 208.170 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982)).
104. Id.
105. Id. The Kentucky Supreme Court rejected Stanford's argument that
he had a constitutional right to treatment. Id. The Court found "that the record
clearly demonstrated that 'there was no program or treatment appropriate for
the appellant in the juvenile justice system .... .'"Id.
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The second of the two consolidated cases involved sixteen-year-old
Heath Wilkins. 10 6 Wilkins killed Nancy Allen by stabbing her seven
times after robbing a convenience store.' 0 7 He was charged with first
degree murder, armed criminal action and carrying a concealed
weapon. 10 8 He was subsequently certified for trial as an adult and sentenced to death. 10 9 The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the sentence, rejecting Wilkins's argument that the punishment violated the
eighth amendment. 110 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in
both cases to decide whether the eighth amendment prohibits the
death penalty for crimes committed by sixteen- or seventeen-year-old
offenders. II I
The consolidated Stanford decision resulted in a plurality opinion.
Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality, joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist
and Justices White and Kennedy concluded that no national consensus
presently forbids the imposition of capital punishment on sixteen- and
seventeen-year-old murderers." 2 Significantly, however, the plurality
applied only the first prong of the Gregg test, rejecting application of the
proportionality prong. 1 3 Justice O'Connor, while agreeing that no national consensus presently forbids capital punishment for sixteen- and
seventeen-year-old offenders and concurring in the judgment," 4 concluded, as did dissenting Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, * 15 that the Court had a constitutional obligation to conduct a
proportionality analysis.' 16 As a result, although the plurality disregarded the second prong of the Gregg test, five Justices agreed that the
Constitution mandated a proportionality analysis.
Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality, stated that there are two
17
(1) if
ways a prescribed punishment violates the eighth amendment:'
it is one of" 'those modes or acts of punishment . . . considered cruel
and unusual at the time that the Bill of Rights was adopted' "118 and
(2) if it is contrary to the " 'evolving standards of decency that mark the
106. Id. Wilkins was convicted of the premeditated murder of Nancy Allen.
Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. The Court found Wilkins competent to stand trial, and he entered

guilty pleas to all charges. Id.
109. Id. at 2973-74. Wilkins was certified under a Missouri Statute which
permits persons between 14 and 17 years of age who have committed felonies to
be tried as adults. Id. (citing Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.071 (1986)).
110. Id. at 2974.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 2972.
113. Id. at 2974-75. For a further discussion of the rejection of the proportionality prong, see supra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
114. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2980-81 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
115. Id. at 2982 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 2979 (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens,JJ., dissenting).

117. Id. at 2974.
118. Id. (quoting Ford v. Wainright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986) (holding that
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progress of a maturing society.' "19 Because neither Stanford nor Wilkins argued that the death penalty was considered cruel and unusual in
1789,120 the Court had to determine whether capital punishment for
sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders violated the first prong of the
2
Gregg test. ' '
Stanford and Wilkins offered several kinds of evidence to demon-

strate a consensus in modern society against the execution of sixteenyear-old juveniles. 122 First, they offered empirical evidence demonstrating that of the thirty-seven states whose laws permit capital punishment,
fifteen decline to impose it on sixteen-year-old offenders, and twelve decline to impose it on seventeen-year-old offenders.' 23 Second, they offered evidence demonstrating that juries are reluctant to impose, and
12 4
prosecutors are reluctant to seek, the death penalty for minors.
2
5
Third, the petitioners offered public opinion polls'
and statements
from various public interest groups and professional organizations supporting the position that society objects to juvenile capital punishment.' 26 The petitioners also offered numerous state and federal laws
that set eighteen as the legal age for engaging in various activities, 12 7 as
well as evidence that other countries, especially Western European nations, do not authorize the death penalty for offenders under the age of
eighteen.' 28 Finally, the petitioners argued that imposing the death
penalty on minors does not serve the penological goals of retribution
and deterrence.1

29

eighth amendment prohibits state from inflicting death penalty upon insane
prisoner)).
119. Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). For a discussion
of Trop, see supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
120. For a discussion of execution of minors under common law, see supra
notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
121. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2979.
122. Id. at 2975-77. The petitioners relied heavily on evidence that there is
no federal death penalty statute for offenders under 18. Id. at 2976. The Court,
however, stated: "It is not the burden of Kentucky and Missouri, however, to
establish a national consensus approving what their citizens have voted to do;
rather, it is the 'heavy burden' of petitioners to establish a national consensus
against it." Id. at 2977 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
123. Id. at 2975.
124. Id. at 2977.
125. Id., at 2979.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 2977. The petitioners cited to laws which "set 18 or more as the
legal age for engaging in various activities, ranging from driving to drinking al-

coholic beverages to voting." Id.
128. Id. at 2985 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Many countries, of courseover 50, including nearly all in Western Europe-have formally abolished the
death penalty, or have limited its use to exceptional crimes such as treason.").
129. Id. at 2979. "According to petitioners, [capital punishment] fails to
deter because juveniles, possessing less developed cognitive skills than adults,
are less likely to fear death; and it fails to exact just retribution because
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The Stanford Court excluded most of this evidence,' 3 0 considering
only evidence that fifteen states decline to impose the death penalty on
sixteen-year-old offenders, and that twelve decline to impose it on seventeen-year-old offenders.131 In accord with prior cases which placed a
heavy burden on challengers to demonstrate the applicability of eighth
amendment protection, the Court held this evidence insufficient to
132
prove a national consensus against the death penalty for minors.
The Court found inconclusive the evidence concerning jury and
prosecutor reluctance to impose death penalty sentences on minors,
stating that this evidence merely reflects the fact that a small percentage
of capital crimes are committed by juvenile offenders.1 3 3 The Court further opined that evidence of this nature failed to establish a national
consensus against the death penalty for minors, but rather established a
national consensus that the death penalty should rarely be imposed on
minors.' 34 The Court also quickly disposed of the petitioners' contention that international norms indicate "evolving standards of decency." 1 35 In a footnote, the Court stated that only American
conceptions of decency are relevant because the eighth amendment
merely requires that the practice in question be "accepted among our
36
people."1
A majority of the Court joined in the aforementioned portion of the
opinion. The rest of the opinion, as discussed below, reflects the views
137
of a plurality of the Court.
juveniles, being less mature and responsible, are also less morally blameworthy." Id.
130. Id. at 2975-80. The Court stated: (1) there was no support for petitioner's argument that a demonstrable reluctance ofjuries to impose and prosecutors to seek, capital sentences for 16 and 17 year olds establishes a societal
consensus that such sentences are inappropriate; (2) there is no relevance to the
state laws cited by petitioners which set 18 or more as the legal age for engaging
in various activities; and (3) public opinion polls, the views of interest groups,
and the positions of professional associations are too uncertain a foundation for
constitutional law. Id.
131. Id. at 2975.
132. Id. at 2977 ("As far as the primary and most reliable indication of consensus is concerned-the pattern of enacted laws- petitioners have failed to
carry that burden.").
133. Id. The Court noted that statistics showing a far smaller number of
offenders under 18 than over 18 have been sentenced to death reflect in part the
fact that a far smaller percentage of capital crime is committed by persons in the
younger age group. Id. Beyond that, it is likely that "the very considerations
that induce petitioners and their supporters to believe that death should never be
imposed on offenders under 18 cause prosecutors and juries to believe that it
should rarely be imposed," so that the statistics are no proof of a categorical
aversion. Id.
134. Id.

135.
136.
137.
delivered

Id. at 2975.
Id. at 2975 n.l.
Id. at 2972-82 ("Scalia, J., announced the judgment of the Court and
the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts 1,11, III, and IV-a, in
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The plurality reasoned that state laws setting eighteen as a minimum age for various activities were not relevant in ascertaining "evolving standards of decency"'138 because these laws operate "in gross" and
do not give individual consideration to each offender as is constitutionally required in capital punishment cases. 1 39 Moreover, the plurality
maintained that secondary indicia of national consensus, such as public
opinion polls and the views of professional organizations and interest
groups, were too uncertain to serve as a basis for constitutional
40
analysis. 1
Finally, the plurality rejected the petitioners' evidence that the
death penalty for minors does not meet the goals of penology. 14 1 Justice Scalia wrote that "[i]f such evidence could conclusively establish the
entire lack of deterrent effect and moral responsibility, resort to the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause would be unnecessary; the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would invalidate these
laws for lack of rational basis."' 4 2 The plurality urged that these argu14 3
ments should instead be directed at the legislature.
Although concurring in the judgment, Justice O'Connor disputed
several statements made by the plurality. While stating that the particular cases before the Court could not be overturned on the basis of a
Gregg proportionality analysis, she rejected the plurality's suggestion
"that the use of such analysis is improper as a matter of [e]ighth
[a]mendment jurisprudence."' 1 44 Justice O'Connor stated that, in her
view, age-based statutory classifications which were rejected by the plurality, were relevant to this constitutionally mandated proportionality
which Rehnquist, C.J., and White, O'Connor, and Kennedy, JJ., joined, and an
opinion with respect to Parts IV-B and V, in which Rehnquist, C.J., and White
and Kennedy, JJ., joined.").
138. Id. at 2977.
139. Id. at 2977-78. The Court stated: "These laws set the appropriate
ages for the operation of a system that makes its determinations in gross, and
that does not conduct individualized maturity tests for each driver, drinker, or
voter. The criminal justice system, however, does provide individualized testing." Id. The Court also rejected the petitioners' reliance on the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1988, which limits punishment to offenders 18 and over. Id. at
2976. The Court stated: "That reliance is entirely misplaced. To begin with,
the statute in question does not embody a judgment by the Federal Legislature
that no murder is heinous enough to warrant the execution of such a youthful
offender, but merely that the narrow class of offense it defines is not." Id. (emphasis in original).
140. Id. at 2979. The plurality stated: "We decline the invitation to rest
constitutional law upon such uncertain foundations." Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. The Court stated: "[Olurjob is to identify the 'evolving standards
of decency'; to determine not what they should be, but what they are. We have no
power under the [e]ighth [a]mendment to substitute our belief in the scientific
evidence for the society's apparent skepticism." Id. (emphasis in original).
144. Id. at 2982 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1990

17

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [1990], Art. 4

658

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35: p. 641

analysis. 14 5 Dissenting Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens agreed with Justice O'Connor that the eighth amendment required
a proportionality analysis.146
Justice Brennan, writing for the dissent, stated that the majority's
interpretation of state laws gave "a distorted view of the evidence of
contemporary standards that these legislative determinations provide."' 14 7 He noted that twenty-seven states prohibit the death penalty
for seventeen-year-old offenders and that thirty states do not authorize
it for those who committed their offenses when less than seventeen years
8
of age. 14

Justice Brennan also stated that the rest of the evidence offered by
the petitioners and discarded by the plurality was not only in line with
previous Supreme Court precedents, but also relevant in determining
the "evolving standards of decency" at issue.14 9 He argued that federal
and state statutes could not serve as conclusive evidence of contemporary values when in "the vast majority of cases, juries have not sentenced
juveniles to death."' 150 He made an analogy between Stanford and Coker
v. Georgia,15 1 pointing out that the Coker Court invalidated Georgia's
death penalty statute for rapists precisely because, in the vast majority of
52
cases, juries had not sentenced rapists to death.'
145. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
146. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). As stated previously, however, Justice
O'Connor did not find that application of Gregg's second prong warranted over-

turning the petitioner's sentence. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
147. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 2982-83 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan wrote:

Currently, 12 of the States whose statutes permit capital punishment
specifically mandate that offenders under age 18 not be sentenced to
death. When one adds to these 12 states the 15 (including the District
of Columbia) in which capital punishment is not authorized at all, it
appears that the governments in fully 27 of the States have concluded
that no one under 18 should face the death penalty. A further 3 states
explicitly refuse to authorize sentences of death for those who committed their offenses when under 17, making a total of 30 States that would
not tolerate the execution of petitioner Wilkins.
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations and footnotes omitted).
149. Id. at 2982 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan wrote: "The

method by which this Court assesses a claim that a punishment is unconstitutional because it is cruel and unusual is established by our precedents, and it
bears little resemblance to the method four Members of the Court apply to this
case." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 2984 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent cited to the Brief for
the Office of the Capital Collateral Representative for the State of Florida as
Amicus Curiae which indicated that between January 1, 1982 and June 30, 1988
"there were 97,086 arrests of adults for homicide, and 1,772 adult death
sentences, or 1.8 percent; and 8,911 arrests of minors for homicide compared to
41 juvenile death sentences, or 0.5 percent." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).

151. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
152. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2984 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a discussion
of Coker v. Georgia, see supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
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Justice Brennan reasoned that the views of professional organizations were relevant as objective indicia of public opinion and therefore
relevant in the Court's inquiry. 153 He also stated that in the past, the
Supreme Court had recognized legislation in other countries in its
eighth amendment analysis especially when ascertaining "evolving standards of decency."' 1 54 Finally, in concurrence with Justice O'Connor,
Justice Brennan stated that the public's perception of juvenile executions could not be conclusive without the utilization of a proportionality
analysis. 155
The final outcome of Stanford can be summarized as follows.
Although five Justices concluded that the execution of sixteen-year-old
offenders passed constitutional scrutiny according to the "evolving standards of decency" test of Gregg's first prong, five Justices maintained that
the eighth amendment mandated a "proportionality analysis," under
Gregg's second prong. Under the first prong of Gregg, four Justices accepted legislative enactments as the sole evidence reflecting contemporary values concerning juvenile capital punishment, but five Justices
stated that such evidence was inadequate to determine contemporary
values. Justice O'Connor stated that age-based classifications were also
relevant to the eighth amendment inquiry, while dissenting Justices
Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens stated that jury trends, international norms and views of professional organizations were relevant as
objective indicia of public opinion under the first prong of Gregg.

IV.

ANALYSIS

In concluding that the Kentucky and Missouri death penalty statutes
passed eighth amendment scrutiny, the Stanford Court relied primarily
on evidence that twenty-two similar state statutes authorized the death
153. Id. at 2985 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma,
487 U.S. 815 (1988)). The Court emphasized that "[w]here organizations with
expertise in a relevant area have given careful consideration to the question of a
punishment's appropriateness, there is no reason why that judgment should not
be entitled to attention as an indicator of contemporary standards." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent cited the following organizations: American
Bar Association, National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, American Law Institute and the National Commission on Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). All of these organizations oppose the
imposition of the death penalty on anyone under 18 years of age. Id. (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
154. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice Brennan noted that
"within the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for juvenile
crimes appears to be overwhelmingly disapproved." Id. at 2986 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). For a discussion of international norms and United States domestic
law, see infra notes 186-244.
155. Id. at 2987-88 (Brennan,J., dissenting). "[T]he proportionality principle takes account not only of the 'injury to the person and to the public' caused
by a crime, but also of the 'moral depravity' of the offender." Id. (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977)).
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penalty for minors. 1 5 6 By rejecting other indicia reflecting societal
norms, 15 7 the Stanford analysis results in a tautological argument. The
Court essentially adopts the reasoning that statutes authorizing the
death penalty for sixteen-year-old offenders do not violate societal
norms because societal norms have already been defined by similar statutes authorizing the death penalty for sixteen-year-old offenders. Moreover, the methodology of Stanford 158 is inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's prior methodology in other capital punishment cases.15 9 In the
past, the Supreme Court looked not only to state statutes when determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual, but also to jury
160
trends, international norms and views of professional organizations.
The Stanford Court's deviation from that traditional methodology in capital punishment cases highlights the need for a more consistent approach in determining "evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society."
This Note suggests a broader analysis of the phrase "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" than that
used by the Stanford Court. The Stanford Court brushed aside important
threshold issues, particularly that of providing a straightforward definition of "evolving standards of decency." For example, does the phrase
indicate status quo contemporary values, or should the phrase include
values and norms not yet adopted by all of society? Moreover, do standards of a maturing society include standards adopted by the international community or are they restricted to societal norms within the
United States? The following section will address these questions by
demonstrating that courts should consistently consider jury trends and
international norms when determining whether society approves or dis156. For a discussion of the Stanford Court's primary reliance on state statutes in its decision, see supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
157. For a discussion of the Stanford Court's rejection of all evidence except
state statutes, see supra notes 133-43 and accompanying text.

158. 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989).
159. It is submitted that the Stanford Court did not take into account jury
sentencing trends which were relevant in previous Supreme Court cases. See
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (jury determinations are relevant
in Court's constitutional scrutiny); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987) (same);
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (same); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976) (same). It is also submitted that the Stanford Court did not take into account international norms which were relevant in previous Supreme Court
cases. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (civilized treatment recognized in international customary norms); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782
(1982) (same); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (same); Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86 (1958) (same).
160. It is submitted that the Stanford Court refused to evaluate objective
indicators used to determine "evolving standards of decency" as had previous
Supreme Court death penalty cases. For a discussion of "subjective evaluation"
in Gregg v. Georgia and Coker v. Georgia, see supra notes 59-72 and accompanying

text.
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approves of a particular form of punishment.161
A.

Sentencing Juries and StatisticalAnalysis

1. Precedent Established
Determinations of sentencing juries are a source of objective indicia
necessary to evaluate "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."' 6 2 Prior to Stanford, Supreme Court death
penalty cases had consistently included determinations of sentencing juries in their constitutional analysis.' 63 As a cross-section of the community, the jury is a reliable objective index of contemporary values. 164 As
recognized by the Gregg Court, "(O]ne of the most important functions
any jury can perform in making ...

a selection [between life imprison-

ment or death for a defendant convicted in a capital case] is to maintain
a link between contemporary community values and the penal system."' 16 5 Adoption of this reasoning is evident in later death penalty
cases such as Coker v. Georgia 166 and Thompson v. Oklahoma, 16 7 where the
Supreme Court explicitly weighed evidence regarding jury trends. 16 8
In Coker, the Court held unconstitutional the imposition of the
death penalty for rape almost exclusively because juries rarely sentenced
rapists to death. 16 9 Because of the considerable weight attached to jury
161. For a discussion ofjury trends with respect to capital punishment, see
infra notes 162-76 and accompanying text. For a discussion of international
norms, see infra notes 186-244 and accompanying text.
162. See Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2983-85 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice
Brennan stated: "Just as we have never insisted that a punishment have been
rejected unanimously by the States before we may judge it cruel and unusual, so
we have never adopted the extraordinary view that a punishment is beyond
Eighth Amendment challenge if it is sometimes handed down by a jury." Id. at
2983-84 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
163. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 792 (1982) (holding death penalty cruel and unusual punishment for participation in felony in which accomplice commits murder, although about one-third of American jurisdictions
authorized such punishment; six "nontriggermen" were sent to death row by
juries and three had been already executed); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584
(1977) (Court held death penalty for rapist unconstitutional because in vast majority of cases juries had not sentenced rapists to death); Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 181 (1976) (jury determinations relevant and part of objective indicia
reflecting contemporary values).
164. See Gersten, supra note 7, at 113.
165. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181 ("The jury also is a significant and reliable objective index of contemporary values because it is so directly involved.").
166. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
167. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
168. For a discussion of Coker, see supra notes 55-58, 69-70 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Thompson, see supra notes 88-100 and accompanying
text.
169. For a discussion of Coker's adherence to jury determinations in its
analysis, see supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text. It should be noted that
the Coker decision parallels the present issue in Stanford. Both Coker and Stanford
address the fact that juries rarely impose the death penalty for rapists or children.
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trends in the Coker decision, Coker bolsters the proposition stated in
Gregg that jury trends are a reliable indicator of contemporary values and
furthermore, must be considered when proceeding under the eighth
amendment. In refusing to consider jury sentencing trends, the Stanford
Court abandoned the established practice of the Supreme Court in reviewing eighth amendment challenges to the death penalty.
In Stanford, petitioner Wilkins pointed out that the last execution of
a person who committed a capital crime under seventeen years of age
occurred in 1959.170 The Court gave no weight to this statistic. 17 '
Ironically, however, only a year before, the Thompson Court, faced with
similar factual evidence, concluded that juries refused to sentence fifteen-year-old offenders to death because not one had been sentenced
since 1948, when the last execution of a fifteen-year-old took place in
72
the United States.'
In Stanford, statistics were also admitted into evidence which
demonstrated that actual executions for crimes committed by offenders
under eighteen years of age accounted for only two percent of the total
number of executions that have occurred between 1642 and 1986 in the
United States.' 73 Although the Stanford Court conceded that a "substantial discrepancy" existed between the number of juvenile and adult
executions,' 74 the Court concluded that this evidence "does not establish the requisite proposition that the death sentence for offenders
75
under 18 is categorically unacceptable to prosecutors and juries.'
Instead, the Court determined that this evidence established a national
consensus that the death penalty should be rarely imposed on
76
minors.'
The Stanford Court's conclusion is without merit and is inconsistent
with precedent especially in light of Coker where the death penalty for
This should be distinguished from the issue addressed in Gregg. In Gregg, the
Court addressed the relative infrequency of jury verdicts imposing the death sentence for murder and stated that this evidence does not indicate rejection of
capital punishment per se. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182.
170. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2977.
171. Id.
172. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 832.
173. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2977 (citing Streib, Imposition of Death Sentences for
Juvenile Offenders, Jan. 1, 1982-April 1, 1989 p. 2 (paper for Cleveland-Marshall
College of Law)). The Court also admitted into evidence statistics showing that
from 1982 through 1988 "out of 2,106 total death sentences, only 15 were imposed on individuals who were 16 or under when they committed their crimes,
and only 30 on individuals who were 17 at the time of the crime." Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. The Court stated: "To the contrary, it is not only possible but
overwhelmingly probable that the very considerations which induce petitioners
and their supporters to believe that death should never be imposed on offenders
under 18 cause prosecutors and juries to believe that it should rarely be imposed." Id.
176. Id.
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rape was abolished precisely because juries rarely sentenced rapists to
death. The Court's analysis, by rejecting evidence of jury trends, is an
incomplete evaluation of society's conceptions of standards of decency.
2.

Contemporary Values Reflected injury Sentencing Trends

Statistics bolster the proposition that American society is presently
moving away from the imposition of capital punishment for juvenile offenders. 1 77 As early as 1965, a Gallup Survey showed that only twentythree percent of respondents favored capital punishment for persons
under twenty-one years of age. 17 8 Recent sentencing patterns between
1983 and 1987 also indicate that the trend is toward the abolition of
capital punishment for minors. 179 Statistics show that between December, 1983 and March, 1987 juveniles under the age of eighteen on death
row decreased in number from thirty-eight to thirty-two; a sixteen percent decrease. 180 For the same time period, however, the overall death
row population increased by forty-two percent. 18 1 Statistics show that
eleven juveniles were sentenced to death in 1982, while only nine in
1983, six in 1984, four in 1985, and seven in 1986.182
The contention of the Stanford Court that the infrequency of the
death penalty sentence for juveniles results from the infrequency of
criminal homicides by juveniles is inadequate. Statistics demonstrate
that between 1973 and 1983 juveniles have accounted for about an average of nine percent of all arrests for murder and non-negligent manslaughter. 183 This proportion has been steadily declining, from 10.4
177. See V.

STREIB,

supra note 8, at 30. "[A] deep-seated reluctance to sen-

tence youths to death is reflected dramatically in the declining rate of juvenile

death sentences, the declining juvenile death row population, and the minuscule
proportion of juvenile murderers actually sentenced to death." Id. Streib specifically quotes Justice Brennan's reaction to such reluctance: "When an unusually severe punishment is authorized for wide-scale application but not, because
of society's refusal, inflicted save in a few instances, the inference is compelling
that there is a deep-seated reluctance to inflict it." Id. (quoting Furman v. Geor-

gia, 408 U.S. 238, 300 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
178. See Gersten, supra note 7, at 114 (citing Erskine, The Pools: CapitalPunishment, 34 PUB. OPINION Q. 290 (1970)).
179. Id. Gersten also notes that of the "approximately 280 death sentences
imposed by juries each year from 1982 to 1986, only one percent to 2 percent of
these were imposed on juveniles." Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.

182. See V. STREIB, supra note 8, at 27. Streib notes the contrast that
"[w]hile the number ofjuvenile death sentences has been declining significantly
each year, the number of adult death sentences has remained fairly constant at a
rate of 250 to 300 a year." Id. at 27-29.
183. See id. at 29.
Approximately 9.2 percent of criminal homicides from 1973 through
1983 were committed by persons under age eighteen .... While only a
small percentage of these criminal homicides were capital murders, it
seems reasonable to assume that juveniles commit roughly the same
proportion (9 percent) of capital murders as of all criminal homicides.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1990

23

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [1990], Art. 4

664

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35: p. 641

percent in 1973 to 7.4 percent in 1983.184 The nine percent representing juveniles arrested for capital murders only, however, has remained
the same throughout this period.' 85
Without taking into account the trend against juvenile executions as
evidenced by jury sentencing patterns and bolstered by statistics reflecting societal norms, the Stanford Court could not have focused on contemporary values in its eighth amendment analysis. It is submitted that
in future capital punishment cases the Court should consistently weigh
jury trends under the first prong of the Gregg test because they provide a
reliable objective index of contemporary values.
B.

International Norms

While the majority in Stanford refused to consider relevant international norms concerning the death penalty for juveniles, 186 the dissent
pointed out that the United States stands almost alone in its tolerance of
juvenile executions.1 8 7 Justice Brennan noted that since 1979, Amnesty
International has recorded only eight executions of offenders under
eighteen, three of which were carried out in the United States. 188 Furthermore, he pointed out that the United States has signed three executive agreements which prohibit capital punishment for minors. 189
At present, there are at least three possible methods of applying
international law to death penalty cases. 190 One method of analysis
In striking contrast to this 9 percent commission rate, juveniles have
received a maximum of 2 percent to 3 percent of all capital sentences
imposed over this period.

Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2975. The Court, however, in its criticism of the
dissent, did acknowledge that customary practice in other nations does affect
interpretation of constitutional provisions. The Court stated:
We emphasize that it is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive, rejecting the contention of petitioners and their various amici...
that the sentencing practices of other countries are relevant. While
"practices of other nations, particularly other democracies, can be relevant to determining whether a practice uniform among our people is
not merely an historical accident, but rather so 'implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty' that it occupies a place not merely in our mores, but,
test permitting, in our Constitution as well," . . . they cannot serve to
establish the first Eighth Amendment prerequisite, that the practice is
accepted among our people.
Id. at 2975 n.1 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
187. Id. at 2985 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
188. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (other five executions were carried out in

Pakistan, Bangladesh, Rwanda and Barbados).
189. Id. at 2985 & n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Article 6(5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Article 4(5) of the American
Convention on Human Rights; Article 68 of the Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War).
190. Some commentators have suggested at least five. See generally Sprout,
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views the execution ofjuvenile offenders as a violation of a norm of customary international law which is binding on the United States and applies to the states through the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. 191
The second method calls for the indirect use of international norms to
interpret various provisions of the United States Constitution, including
the eighth amendment. 19 2 The third method, assuming that a norm of
customary law against juvenile executions cannot be established, maintains that the Supreme Court should look to foreign practice, treaty provisions, etc., and take into account "the climate of international
93
opinion" when evaluating contemporary values. 1
1. Norm of Customary InternationalLaw and the United States
With regard to the first method of analysis, two issues deserve consideration: (1) is there a norm of customary international law barring
the execution of sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders? 19 4 and (2) if
this norm is established, is it binding on the United States for95purposes
of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution?'
a.

Customary International Norm Against Juvenile Executions

A principle attains the status of a rule of customary international
law if it meets two criteria: 1) there must be evidence of state custom or
practice demonstrating that the principle has been adopted by most
states; and 2) the state practice must be followed out of a sense of legal
obligation or opiniojuris.196 The role of custom as a source of international law is expressly recognized in Article 38 of the statute of the International Court of Justice, a statute which has been recognized by most
Theories as to the Applicability of International Law in the Federal Courts of the United

States, 26 AM.J. INT'L L. 281 (1932).
191. Brief for Amicus Curiae, International Human Rights Law Group in
Support of Petitioner at 7, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (No.
86-6169) [hereinafter Brief].
192. See generally Christenson, The Uses of Human Rights Norms to Inform Constitutional Interpretation, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 39 (1981).
193. This approach is evident in previous Supreme Court decisions concerning the eighth amendment, including Trop v. Dulles. For a discussion of Trop,
see supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
194. Hartman, Unusual Punishment: The Domestic Effects of InternationalNorms
Restricting the Application of the Death Penalty, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 655, 665-67 (1983)
(author notes that existence of customary norms is determined by empirical evidence of state practice which is "inescapably incomplete" and uncertain).
195. Id. at 682; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN REL. LAW § 111
(1) (1987). Harold G. Maier provides a complete analysis of the theory that customary international law becomes part of United States law and is binding on
the states through the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. See Maier, United
States Constitution in its Third Century: Foreign Affairs: Distribution of Constitutional

Authority: Pre-emption of State Law: A Recommended Analysis, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 832
(1989).
196. See Brief, supra note 191, at 11-12.
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countries of the world community.' 9 7
Substantial evidence exists demonstrating a state practice against
the execution of offenders under the age of eighteen. Fifty countries,
including most Western European nations, have abolished the death
penalty or "have limited its use to exceptional crimes such as treason." 198 These countries clearly do not acknowledge the execution of
juvenile offenders. Statistics also reveal that of nations retaining capital
punishment, a majority (sixty-five) prohibit the execution of offenders
under the age of eighteen. 19 9 These countries include those that share
the Anglo-American heritage and its jurisprudence: Britain, Canada and
Australia. 20 0 Of the sixty-one countries that retain capital punishment
and have no statutory provisions exempting juveniles, some have ratified international treaties prohibiting the execution ofjuvenile offenders
and twenty-seven others do not in practice impose the penalty. 20 ' Thus,
a definite majority of countries in the world community prohibit the execution of offenders under the age of eighteen.
Although evidence amply demonstrates the existence of state practice against the execution of minors, this practice must be followed out
of a sense of legal obligation to constitute a norm of international law.
As noted, international treaties best demonstrate opiniojuris or legal obligation. 20 2 At present there are three international treaties which explicitly prohibit juvenile death penalties: Article 6(5) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 20 3 (International
Covenant); Article 4(5) of the American Convention on Human
Rights 20 4 (American Convention); and Article 68 of the Geneva Con20 5
vention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
20 6
(Geneva Convention).
Moreover, the United Nations General Assembly has endorsed, and the Seventh United Nations Congress on the
Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders has adopted "Resolutions and Decisions of United Nations Economic and Social Council"
197. Id. at 11; see also Hartman, supra note 194, at 665-66.
198. See Stanford, 109 S.Ct. at 2985 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
199. Id.(Brennan, J., dissenting). In addition, the norm against the execution of juvenile offenders existed prior to its codification in the International
Covenant and other treaties. See Thompson, 487 U.S. 815 (capital punishment is
non-existent in most of Western Europe).
200. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830-31.
201. Id.
202. See Brief, supra note 191, at 12. "Courts will look to treaties, national
laws, the practice of international organizations ... as evidence of the existence
of a customary norm of international law." Id.
203. 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 53, U.N. Doc. a/6316 (1966).
204. Article 4(5) of the American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S. Official Records, OEA/ser. K/XVI/1.1, doc. 65, rev. 1, corr. 2 (1970), reprinted in 9
International Legal Material 673, 676 (1970).
205. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, August 12, 1949, art. 68, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365.
206. See Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2985 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol35/iss3/4

26

Perfecky: Children, the Death Penalty and the Eighth Amendment: An Analysis

1990]

NOTE

667

which specifically prohibits the execution of offenders under the age of
eighteen. 20 7 International treaties and resolutions clearly denounce the
practice of executing offenders under the age of eighteen and thus create the necessary opiniojuris to complement the firm state practice. The
issue next arises, assuming the norm has been established by the demonstration of empirical evidence cited above, whether the United States
is bound to follow the norm.
b.

Can the United States be Bound by the Norm?

The International Court ofJustice holds that a State may keep itself
from becoming bound by a rule of customary international law if:
(1) the State mounts an explicit and disciplined opposition to the coalescing norm; 20 8 and (2) the State has maintained consistent opposition
since the rule's formation.2 0 9 Thus, a state may avoid the application of
an international norm through explicit rejection of the norm combined
with a consistent practice contrary to the norm.
It appears that the United States presently has rejected the norm
against the execution of juvenile offenders. Of the three international
treaties prohibiting the execution ofjuvenile offenders under the age of
eighteen, the United States has ratified only one-the Geneva Conven2 10
tion Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.
Under domestic law, ratification of a treaty by the United States is necessary if the treaty is to constitute law for the purposes of the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution. 2 1' The United States failed to
212
ratify both the International Covenant and American Convention.
207. Id. at 2985 n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
208. See Brief,supra note 191, at 28; see also Hartman, supra note 194, at 682-

85. Hartman describes a dissenting state in these terms: "Although a nation
that protests during the process of norm creation may not prevent the formation
of customary law, it may succeed in carving out for itself an exemption from the
rule, while passive states will be bound." Id. at 683.
209. See Brief, supra note 191, at 28.
210. See id. at 32-34. The vote by Congress to adopt Article 68 was 33 votes
to five, with five abstentions. Id. at 34. It was noted that during the Geneva
conferences when Article 68 was formulated, the United States delegation
"failed to mount any unequivocal opposition to the rule excluding juvenile offenders from punishment by death." Id.
211. The supremacy clause states:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the judges of every State shall be bound thereby,
anything in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
212. See Brief, supra note 191, at 35-39. Although it was never ratified by
Congress, the United States representative "eventually voted in favor of adoption of the International Covenant in 1966." Id. at 35. Further, the United
States sponsored a General Assembly Resolution of the United Nations which
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Thus the norm against the execution ofjuveniles under eighteen is presently binding on the United States only at time of war. Furthermore,
although President Carter signed the International Covenant, the
United States made a reservation to Article 6(5) which prohibits the execution of offenders under the age of eighteen. 2 13 While the wording of
the reservation does not appear to be an express refusal to follow the
norm, its implications, and the fact that the United States never ratified
2 14
the treaty, weakens the norm of customary international law analysis.
Consistent practice within the United States contrary to the norm
against juvenile executions is inconclusive at present. First, the execution ofjuvenile offenders has been rare throughout the history of American capital punishment. Only two percent of legal executions were for
crimes committed by offenders under the age of eighteen. 2 15 Moreover,
the United States, in its recent history, has assumed fiduciary obligations
towards its juveniles. At the turn of the century, the juvenile court system was established in the United States to prevent the subjugation of
juvenile offenders to harsh penalties prescribed by the adult penal system because of broad agreement that adolescents as a class are less mature and responsible than adults. 2 16 The United States Supreme Court,
too, has reflected this proposition in its decisions, 2 17 taking into consid218
eration a defendant's youth as a mitigating factor in capital cases.
recognized the International Covenant. Id. at 36. President Carter did sign the
International Covenant in 1977 and submitted it, with reservations, to the Senate in 1978. Id. The reservations, however, were considered to be only "proposals" and not amounting to "an explicit and principled manifestation of
refusal to follow the international norm." Id. at 37-38.
213. Article 6(5) of the International Convention states: "Sentence of
death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below eighteen
years of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant women." See id. at 17.
A memorandum from the State Department provided: "The United States
reserves the right to impose capital punishment on any person duly convicted
under existing or future laws permitting the imposition of capital punishment."
See id. at 36-37. The State Department's explanation that the proposed reservation was with respect to implementation difficulties "and certainly not the preservation of any right to execute children or pregnant women, something never
done in the United States" poses uncertainty, however, as to an explicit reservation. See Hartman, supra note 194, at 685.
214. See Brief, supra note 191, at 46. "Amicus submits that as a result of
having signed these treaties, the United States incurred legal obligations which
are violated when juvenile offenders are executed." Id. They specifically look to
Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which provides that
"[a] state is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty ... subject to ratification ... until it shall have made its intention

clear not to become a party to the treaty." Id. at 46-47.
215. For a general discussion of juvenile capital punishment at common
law, see supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
216. See generally In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966).
217. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 834 (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622,
635 (1979)).
218. Id.
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The United States, however, has never categorically prohibited the execution of sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders and, therefore, the
norm against juvenile executions has never been explicitly adopted by
this country. 2 19 At best, the argument that the United States violates a
norm of customary international law by authorizing the execution of juvenile offenders can only be persuasive.
2.

Indirect Use of InternationalLaw in Interpretingthe Constitution

The second method of applying international law to death penalty
cases calls for the indirect use of international norms to interpret provisions of the United States Constitution. This proposition is derived
from the "incorporation" theory, which states that "international law
was part of the English common law, that, as such, it became part of the
common law of the American colonies, and remained so after the secession of those colonies from the British Empire and after the formation of
the United States." '2 20 International law was part of English common
law due to the accepted belief throughout the seventeenth century of a
"natural law" which set forth uniform rights and duties of nations. 22 '
This philosophical approach is reflected in article I, section 8, clause 10
of the Constitution, which grants Congress the power to define and pun'2 22
ish crimes against the "Law of Nations."
United States federal courts of the eighteenth century applied foreign customary norms in ascertaining federal common law. 2 23 For example, in Talbot v. Jansen, 2 24 Mr. Justice Iredell stated that the law of
nations constituted a branch of the common law. 2 2 5 In Ware v. Hylton, 226 Mr. Justice Chase observed that "the law of nations is part of the
municipal law of Great Britain."'2 2 7 More recently, however, the Second
Circuit in Filartiga v. Pena-1rala22 8 and the Tenth Circuit in Fernandez v.
Wilkinson 22 9 have initiated the revival of constitutional interpretation us219. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. 2969.
220. Sprout, supra note 190, at 282.
221. Id. at 284.
222. See Hartman, supra note 194, at 660 & n.21 ("Customary law is a timehonored and essential component of international law and is domestically enforceable in the United States.").
223. See id. at 661 (citing The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825) (illegality under international law of slave trade)); Bentzon v. Boyle, 13 U.S. (9
Cranch) 191, 198 (1815) (process for determining law of nations governing belligerent and neutral rights); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 199 (1796) (effect of
law of nations on Virginia statute to confiscate property of British Subjects)).
224. 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 133 (1795).
225. Sprout, supra note 190, at 284-85.
226. 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 199 (1796).
227. Id.
228. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
229. 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
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ing international human rights norms. 23 0
In Filartiga,the court recognized the absolute prohibition of torture
in customary international law. 2 3 ' Dr. Joel Filartiga brought a wrongful
death action in federal court for the tortured death of his son Joelito by
Paraguay's Inspector General of Police, Pena-Irala. 23 2 In its decision
against Pena-Irala, the Second Circuit reaffirmed that "[t]he law of nations forms an integral part of the common law, and a review of the
history surrounding the adoption of the Constitution demonstrates that
it became part of the law of the United States, upon the adoption of the
Constitution. ' 23 3 In Fernandez, the Tenth Circuit, using the doctrine of
incorporation, held that a prolonged detention of an alien violated international norms upholding human dignity; therefore, the defendant's six
month detention was held unconstitutional. 2 34 This incorporation theory should have been addressed by the Stanford Court, particularly in
light of its recent revival by federal circuit courts. By ignoring developments within the federal courts and historical precedent, the Stanford
analysis is inflexible and incomplete.
Although the plurality in Stanford failed to incorporate a norm of
customary international law against juvenile executions into its constitutional analysis, a strong argument, based on Supreme Court precedent,
still prevails: the Court, under stare decisis, had an obligation to look to
international standards in its decisionmaking process.
3.

Supreme Court Precedent, the Death Penalty and InternationalNorms

The strongest argument for interpreting the eighth amendment in
light of international standards, assuming no norm exists against the execution of sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders, is that Supreme
Court precedent has consistently used this method. In Trop v. Dulles,2 35
where the phrase "evolving standards of decency" was first set forth, the
Court directly referred to an "internationally shared principle" of civilized treatment in its eighth amendment analysis. 2 36 The Court in
230. For a discussion of the Fernandez decision, see generally Hassan, The
Doctrine of Incorporation: New Vistasfor the Enforcement of InternationalHuman Rights?
5 HUM. RTS. Q. 68 (1983). For an in-depth discussion of the Filartigadecision,
see generally Christenson, supra note 192.
231. Christenson, supra note 192, at 41 ("Following an extensive review of

international human rights documents condemning and prohibiting torture, as
well as opinions of noted publicists and other sources of customary international

law, the court rightly concluded that official torture violates the law of
nations.").
232. Id. (citing Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980)).
233. See Brief, supra note 191, at 8.
234. See Hassan, supra note 230, at 75.
235. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
236. Id. at 102.
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Furman v. Georgia23 7 and Solem v. Helm 238 read the words "cruel and unusual" in light of the English proscription against selective and irregular
use of penalties. In Coker v. Georgia,23 9 the Court took account of the
"climate of international opinion concerning the acceptability of a particular punishment" when it surveyed United Nations documents which
indicated that only three out of sixty nations retained capital punishment in rape cases. 2 40 In Enmund v. Florida,24 1 the Court again referred
to "international opinion" in determining that the death sentence violated the eighth amendment when imposed on an offender who had not
intended to kill his victim. 2 4 2 Finally, in Thompson v. Oklahoma,2 4 3 decided only one year before Stanford, the Court clearly weighed international norms in reaching its conclusion that imposing the death penalty
244
on fifteen-year-old offenders violated the eighth amendment.
The growth of a comparative approach to constitutional and international human rights law is evident by its acceptance both internationally and domestically. For example, in Sterling v. Cupp, 24 5 the Oregon
Supreme Court looked to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights when it held
that the subjugation of prisoners to personal offensive touching or observation by guards of the opposite sex violated both the United States
and Oregon Constitutions. 24 6 In 1988, Zimbabwe's Supreme Court, in
State v. Neube, 24 7 looked to the Universal Declaration, the European
Convention and the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution when it was faced with the issue of whether the whipping of an adult
male offender constituted "inhuman or degrading punishment" in violation of Zimbabwe's constitution. 2 48 Justice Gubbay looked to decisions
237. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1972).
238. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 285 (1983). The English Bill of Rights
repeated the principle of proportionality in language that was later adopted in
the eighth amendment: " '[E]xcessive Baile ought not to be required nor excessive Fines imposed nor cruell and unusuall Punishments inflicted.' " Id. (quoting 1 W. & M., sess. 2, ch.2 (1689)).
239. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
240. See Brief, supra note 191, at 49 (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
597 n.10 (1977)).
241. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
242. Brief, supra note 191, at 49 (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,
796 (1982)).
243. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
244. Id. at 2696. For a discussion of international norms in Thompson, see
supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
245. 290 Or. 611, 625 P.2d 123 (1981).
246. Id. at 128.
247. 2 S. Afr. L. Rep. 702 (1988).
248. Lillich, The Constitution and InternationalHuman Rights, 83 AM. J. INT'L L.
851, 854-55 (1989) (author notes that judges in foreign countries can review
constitutionality of own legislative and administrative actions against standards
derived directly from international sources and indirectly from United States Bill
of Rights).
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of the United States Supreme Court involving the eighth amendment,
especially Trop v. Dulles, and "'borrowed' from them to frame
Zimbabwe's judicial approach to the concept of 'inhuman or degrading
punishment.' "249
Policy considerations bolster the argument that the Supreme Court
should apply international standards and human rights norms in its decision-making process. The Founding Fathers pieced together the
"American Charter" on the basis of Natural Rights, a theory which involves no "territorial confines" and is the basis of international human
rights norms today. 250 The paradox lies in the fact that the United
States, in its refusal to recognize international and customary law in its
domestic affairs, still points to the "interconnectedness of global reality
as justification for universal norms outlawing torture, preventing arbitrary arrest and detention, and condemning terrorism and gross viola251
tions of human rights."
V.

CONCLUSION

The Stanford analysis is incomplete for three reasons. First, the reliance solely on state statutes 2 52 is inconsistent with precedent and may
weigh heavily in future "cruel and unusual punishment cases" because it
gives states the power to determine the constitutional norm. While this
reflects the Rehnquist Court's deference to legislative enactments, 253 it
is questionable whether such deference is proper in the context of the
death penalty analysis because the eighth amendment was intended to
2 54
provide a check on legislative power.
Second, and more importantly, the Stanford holding is not responsive to the changing views of Americans toward capital punishment.
The phrase "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society" suggests that societal norms are developing continually. It does not necessarily suggest that contemporary values alone
should determine norms. Moreover, Stanford may turn out to be a self249. Id. at 854.
250. See Christenson, supra note 192, at 7.
The Founders constructed our social contract using theories, such as
those of Locke and Rousseau, based on inalienable rights or natural
rights having no territorial confines and depending for their existence
on no written Constitution. Our present day policy, however, with its
skeptical and positivist attitude, accepts only the language of the Constitution in its context or court decisions as sources of Constitutional
limitations.
Id.
251. See Christenson, supra note 192, at 6.
252. For a discussion of the Stanford Court's sole reliance on state statutes
for its decision, see supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
253. Dick, Living with the Warren Legacy, 75 A.B.A. J. 79-80 (1984).
254. For a discussion of the eighth amendment and its use as a check on
legislative power, see supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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fulling prophecy. As a result of this precedent, states that presently do
not authorize the death penalty for sixteen-year-old offenders may reevaluate their statutes and enact such punishment. 25 5 If this happens,
then it will be unquestionably true that the death penalty for minors is
consistent with societal norms in the United States.
Finally, the Court's rejection of international norms in its inquiry is
inconsistent with precedent because in previous death penalty cases, the
Supreme Court considered relevant international norms in its eighth
amendment analysis. 2 56 Ironically, with notable exceptions such as
Rwanda, Barbados, Pakistan and Bangladesh, 2 57 the United States now
stands almost alone in its tolerance of capital punishment for sixteenyear-old juvenile offenders.
Tanya M. Perfecky

255. It is submitted that the Stanford ruling may create a similar reaction as
did Furman v. Georgia. See 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The Furman Court noted that
legislatures, instead of defining and enacting capital homicide statutes, "adopted
the method of forthrightly granting juries the discretion" over life and death and
therefore struck down the Georgia statute as a violation of the eighth amendment. Id. at 247. In reaction to Furman, 35 states quickly enacted capital punishment statutes. See Note, State v. Shaw: The Status ofjuvenile Executions, 10 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 171, 174 (1986).

256. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's use of international norms,
see supra notes 235-44 and accompanying text.
257. In the last 10 years, only four other countries besides the United
States have executed offenders who had committed offenses while under 18
years of age: Pakistan, Rwanda, Barbados and Bangladesh. See Stanford, 109 S.
Ct. at 2985 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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